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RECENT CASES
EVIDENCE - CRIMINAL LAW- Admissibility of Evidence
Obtained Through Use of Concealed Radio Transmitter. - The de-
fendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York for selling and conspiring to sell
opium in violation of federal statute. As a means of obtaining
evidence for the prosecution an "undercover agent" for the govern-
ment was sent into the defendant's place of business, with a small
microphone concealed in his overcoat pocket, for the purpose of
transmitting statements of the defendant to -another agent of the
Narcotics Bureau stationed outside with a receiving set. In the course
of conversation between the undercover agent and the defendant, the
latter made incriminating statements which were received and "au-
dited" by the Narcotics agent. Over the defendant's objection, the
conversation as heard with the aid of the receiving set was admitted
in evidence. The defendant contends that the conduct of the two
agents in obtaining such evidence amounted to a violation of the
search-and-seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment of the Con-
stitution and therefore, is inadmissible. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction. On Appeal, HELD:
Affirmed. The fact that evidence had been obtained by having an
undercover agent, whom the defendant trusted, engage the defen-
dant in conversation so that his incriminating statements w6uld be
transmitted by microphone hidden on the undercover agent's per-
son did not render such evidence inadmissible in a criminal prosecu-
tion but only presented an issue of credibility. On Lee v. United
States ......... U. S ......... 72 S. Ct. 967 (1952).
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated and warrants shall not issue but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or things to be seized. United States
Constitution, Amendment IV. The law of searches and seizures
under this amendment reflects the dual purpose of protecting the
privacy of the individual and protecting him against compulsory pro-
duction of evidence to be used against him, as prohibited by the
Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Davis v. Uiited
States, 328 U. S. 582, 90 L. Ed. 1453 (1945). This constitutional
guaranty extends to innocent and guilty alike, McDonald v. United
States, 335 U. S. 451, 93 L. Ed. 153 (1948); Kroska v. United
280
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States, 51 F. 2d. 330 (8th Cir. 1931); it prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures, and must be construed liberally in favor of
the individual, Go-Bart Importing Company v. United States, 282
U. S. 244, 75 L. Ed. 374 (1931) ; Sgro v. United States, 287 U. S.
296, 77 L. Ed. 260 (1932); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S.
452, 76 L. Ed. 877 (1936). It is the duty of the courts to prevent
the impairment of this protection, Grau v. United States, 285 L. S.
124, 77 L. Ed. 212 (1932) ; Gilbert v. United States, 163 F. 2d. 325
(10th Cir. 1947) ; therefore, a search prosecuted in violation of this
guaranty is not made lawful by what it brings to light, Byars v.
United States, 273 U. S. 28, 71 L. Ed. 520 (1926) ; United States
v. Asendio, 171 F. 2d. 122 (3rd Cir. 1948), and a conviction, the
foundation of which is evidence obtained in disregard of liberties
deemed fundamental by the Constitution, cannot stand. McNabb
v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1943). A search and
seizure after entry by means of fraud, stealth, social acquaintance,
or business pretense, as well as force, are unreasonable. Fraternal
Order of Eagles v. United States, 57 F. 2d. 93 (3rd Cir. 1932), and
in order to come within the interdiction of the Fourth Amendment,
the searches and seizures complained of must be unreasonable. Harris
v. United States, 331 U. S. 145, 91 L. Ed. 1399 (1946); United
States v. O'Brien, 174 F. 2d 341 (7th Cir. 1949). The test of
reasonableness by which the constitutional permissibility of a search
and seizure is determined cannot be stated in rigid and absolute
terms; each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances.
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 94 L. Ed. 653 (1950);
Harris v. United States, supra; Go-Bart Importing Company v.
United States, supra. All evidence obtained in violation of this
guaranty must be suppressed when tendered in court. McDonald
vz,. United States, supra. However, in Olinstead v. United States,
277 U. S. 438, 72 L. Ed. 945 (1927), it was held that at common
law the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of
the means by which it was obtained and that, in the absence of
statute, evidence cannot be excluded merely because it was unethical-
ly secured; therefore, evidence obtained by wire tapping was held not
to be self-incrimination within the Fifth Amendment nor unlaw-
ful search and seizure within the Fourth Amendment. Subsequent-
ly, Congress passed an act declaring that no person, not being author-
ized by the sender, shall intercept any communication and divulge
or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of such intercepted communication to any person. Federal
2
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Connunication Act, Section 605; 47 U. S. C. 605; 47 U. S. C. A-
605 (1934). This statute has been construed to operate to render
inadmissible in a trial in the federal .courts evidence obtained by tap-
ping telephone or telegraph lines, Nardoze v. United States, 302
U. S. 379, 82 L. Ed. 314 (1937) ; Weiss v. United-States, 308 U. S.
321, 84 L. Ed. 298 (1939), and this is not an "unlawful search and
seizure" in contravention of the Fourth Amendmentf but evidence
secured by such means is inadmissible solely by reason of Section
605 of the Federal Communication Act, United States v. Coplon,
88 F. Supp. 921 (S. D. N. Y. 1950). Even though wiretapping
is illegal, the Court in Beard v. United States, 82 F. 2d. 837 (1936),.
held that in the prosecution for maintaining gaming establishment
and for conspiracy, evidence obtained by such means is admissible
to establish that the place was a gambling place and was being used
for gambling purposes, even though police were unable to identify
the voices. Testimony secured by spying, while acting in an un-
lawful way which would subject the person obtaining the evidence
to punishment, if otherwise relevant, is competent, Cohn v. State,
120 Tenn. 61, 109 S. W. 1149 (1908); and unless there is some
definite limitation, all doubt should be resolved in favor of admis-
sion. United States v. Matot, 146 F. 2d. 197 (1944). Eavesdrop-
ping alone, though an invasion of privacy, is not a violation of- a
legally recognized "right of privacy". United States v. Goldman,
118 F. 2d 310 (2nd Cir. 1941). Where detectives feign themselves
as accomplices and thereby .obtain evidence, the manner used was
held by several state decisions to bear merely upon its- credibility,
not its admissibility. Shields v. State, 104 Ala. 35, 16 So. 85; 53
Am. St. Rep. 17 (1894); Wright v. State, 7 Tex. App. 574, 32
Am. Rep. 599 (1880). .
Here is presented another situation whereby -the Supreme Court
has upheld unethical, if not unconstitutional, means of obtaining
evidence for admission in a criminal prosecution. It is clear that
only because the manner of procuring the evidencd was unethical
does not prevent its admission. However, in the case here, there
is a conflict between construing the constitutional guaranties liber-
ally in favor of the accused and the admission of evidence secured
by means which were not in existence or foreseen at the time o-f
the adoption of those guaranties. Such seems to have been the
problem in the Ohnstead case; it took an Act of Congress before
the courts would exclude evidence obtained by wiretapping. In both
cases mechanical means were used to procure evidence necessary
3
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for prosecution. In the detectaphone case, mechanism was used to
hear statements given in a subsequent prosecution; ifs use was justi-
fied on the grounds that it only made hearing better and all of the
equipment was outside the defendant's premises. Here the pro-
secuting witness not only used mechanical means outside the premises
of the accused but he sent part of the apparatus into the defendant's
shop. Consequently, this is an extension of the rule in the detecta-
phone case. However, it must be taken into consideration that this
is a five-to-four decision, there being four. separate dissents. These
dissenting justices discredited the employment of science to intrude
on a person's privacy through such a manner of eavesdropping and
expressed strong resentments against giving "legal sanction to such
dirty business that makes for lazy and not alert law enforcement".
Despite the vigorous dissents, the inevitable conclusion is that the
common law tendency favors admitting evidence not prohibited by
some definite rule instead of following any strict rule of incompetence
because of the means of procuring it; the court has given sanction to
the use of mechanism to procure incriminating evidence.
MARION S. RIGGS.
LABOR LAW - Picketing - When an Injunction Will .Lie.-
Plaintiff brought an action against Defendant, individually and as
an officer of the Brotherhood of Marine Engineers, and others, to
enjoin the picketing of Plaintiff's vessels. Intervenor requested the
same relief. The Supreme Court, Special Term, held that the evi-
dence established that the picket lines were purely retaliative in na-
ture because of the refusal of West Coast longshoremen members
of a CIO affiliated union to load vessels of the Isthmian Steamship
Company in California, and the picket lines were not set up as part
of an organization drive and were not in aid of aq attempt to re-
cruit from Plaintiff's marine engineers members for their, union, as
the Defendants claimed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division
held that insofar as the judgment restrained threats, intimidations or
coercion, it was unwarranted by the record, but affirmed the Special
Term in the granting of the injunction. On appeal to the New York
Court of Appeals, HELD, affirmed. An injunction will lie to en-
join picketing in aid of a strike which in its nature is retaliatory.
American President Lines, Limited, et al. v. King, et al., 109 N. Y. S.
2d 507, 110 N. Y. S. 2d 725, 304 N. Y. 708, 107 N. E. 2d 654 (1952).
Peaceful picketing for a lawful purpose will not be enjoined.
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Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Company, Inc., 303 U. S. 323, 58 S. Ct.
578, 82 L. Ed. 872 (1938) ; Bayonne Textile Corporation v. Anteri-
can Federation of Silk Workers et al., 116 N. J. Eq. 146, 172 A.
551, 92 A. L. R. 1450 (1934) ; $. H. & S. Theatres, Inc. v. Fay et al.
260 N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509 (1932).
The interests of capital and labor are at times inimical and the
courts may not decide controversies between the parties so long as
neither resorts to violence, deceit, or misrepresentation to bring about
a desired result. National Protective Association of Steam Fitters
and Helpers v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369 (1902);
Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917). And one's
business may be attacked only to attain some purpose in the eye of
the law thought sufficient to justify the harm that may be done
to others. Exchange Bakery and Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin et al.,
245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927); Senn v. Tile Layers Protec-
tive Union, Local No. 5, et al., 222 Wis. 383, 268 N. W. 270 (1936).
The resulting injury is incidental and must be endured. Exchange
Bakery and Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, et al., supra. The mere fact
that the plaintiff has sustained and will continue to sustain a loss if
picketing is continued is not sufficient to entitle one to injunctive
relief. Scofes v. Hehnar, 205 Ind. 596, 187 N. E. 662 (1933).
Thus, it has been held that no injunction will be granted if picketing
is in aid of a strike to induce customers not to bestow patronage on
the employer's place of business, Ex Parte Heffron, 179 Mo. A. 639,
162 S. W. 652 (1914); Foster v. Retail Clerks' International Pro-
tective Ass'n, 39 Misc. 48, 78 N. Y. S. 860 (1902) ; or is not con-
ducted in such numbers as will of itself amount to intimidation, and
when confined to the seeking of information, such as the number and
names and places of residence of those at work or seeking work on-
the premises against which the strike is in operation, and to the use
of peaceful argument and entreaty for the purpose of procuring such
workmen to support the strike by quitting work, or by not accepting
work, Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 247 F. 192 (aff'd.
252 F. 722, 164 C. C. A. 562) (rev'd. on other grounds 254 U. S.
443, 41 S. Ct. 112, 65 L. Ed. 349) (1917); Mills v. U. S. Printing
Co., 99 App. Div. 605, 91 N. Y. S. 185 (1904); Seubert, Inc. v.
Reiff, 98 Misc. 402, 164 N. Y. S. 522 (1917) ; or is, by means of a
sign truthfully stating that the owners refuse to employ members of
a certain union, to coerce the owners, by diminution of their patron-
age, to violate a contract which they have made with another union
to employ, during a stated period, its members only, Stillwell Theater,
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Inc. v. Sans Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932). On the
other hand, Judge Andrews in Exchange Bakery and Restaurant,
Inc. v. Rifkin, supra, in his exposition of the reciprocal rights of the
employer and employee said that freedom to conduct business or en-
gage in labor is like a property right, threatened and unjustified inter-
ference with which will be prevented by injunction. Thus, a strike
solely to injure an employer's business is unlawful and may be en-
joined. Sarros v. Nouris, 15 Del. Ch. 391, 138 A. 607 (1927). And
picketing will be enjoined if the objective sought is to control em-
ployment in retail trade, Kitty Kelly Shoe Corporation v. United
Retail Employees of Newark, N. J. Local No. 108 et al., 126 N. J.
Eq. 374, 9 A. 2d 295 (1939) ; or to compel an employer to accept a
closed shop, Canter Sample Furniture House, Inc. v. Retail Furnd-
ture Employees Local No. 109 et aL, 122 N. J. Eq. 575, 196 A. 210
(1937); or to induce a breach of contract, Rice Etc. Machine &
Iron Company v. Willard, et al., 242 Mass. 566, 136 N. E. 629
(1922); Walton Lunch Company v. Kearney, 236 Mass. 310, 128
N. E. 429 (1920) ; or if linked with a purpose inimical to the wel-
fare and health of the entire community, Gottlieb v. Matckin, 117
Misc. 128, 191 N. Y. S. 777 (1921). It was further held in that
case that another's business might not be injured or ruined by com-
bination to strike or picket with malice or ill will, but may be at-
tacked only to attain some purpose legally sufficient to justify harm
done, and picketing may not be accompanied by violence, trespass,
collection of crowds, or impeding of free entrance to the employer's
premises. Thus, picketing may be enjoined if accompanied by ob-
struction by physical means of access to the premises picketed, Foster
v. Retail Clerks' International Protective Ass'n. supra; Ellis v.
Journeyman Barbers' International Union of America Local Union
No. 52, 194 Ia. 1179, 191 N. W. 111 (1922); Heitkamperv. Hoffman,
99 Misc. 543, 164 N. Y. S. 533 (1917) ; or if accompanied by force,
violence, threats, physical assaults, abusive and insulting language,
coercion, or intimidation designed to prevent workmen from continu-
ing in or accepting employment with the person against whom the
acts are designed to operate, Langenberg Hat Co. v. United Cloth
Hat and Cap Makers of North America, 266 F. 127 (1920); Marks-
Arnheint, Inc. v. Hillnan, 198 App. Div. 88, 189 N. Y. S. 369
(1921) ; O'Neil v. Behanna, 182 Pa. 236, 37 A. 843, 61 Am. St. Rep.
702 (1897). The Illinois Court said in Schuster v. International
Ass'n. of Machinists, Auto Mechanics Lodge No. 701, 293 Ill. App.
177, 12 N. E. 2d 50 (1937), that peaceful picketing was unlawful
6
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and could be enjoined according to the older decisions in that juris-
diction, but that it did not choose to follow those decisions but pre-
ferred the modern view that peaceful picketing (for a lawful pur-
pose) may not be enjoined. But the New Jersey Court said in
Elkind & Sons, Inc. et al. v. Retail Clerks' International Protective
Ass'n. et al., 144 N. J. Eq. 586, 169 A. 494 (1933), that it must
recognize the decision of the U. S. Supreme Court, which held in
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 42 S. Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed. 254, 27
A. L. R. 375 (1921), that picketing was unlawful, and that it might
be enjoined as such, and that peaceful picketing was a contradiction
in terms. The New Jersey Court also said that "picketing" is a mili-
tant word and the act of picketing is militant in both character and
purpose; its purpose, compulsion or coercion, is accomplished only
by intimidation. An opposite view is taken in 16 R. C. L. 454, where
it is said that picketing is not unlawful per se. Picketing may sim-
ply mean the stationing of men for observation, and the doing of
such an act, solely for such purpose, there being no physical annoy-
ance or hinderance of any person, is lawful. The Supreme Court of
the United States follows the later decision of the Illinois Court,
Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Company, Inc., 303 U. S. 323, 58 S. Ct.
578, 82 L. Ed. 872 (1938), and has struck down broadly drawn
statutes which place blanket prohibitions on all picketing activities
as a violation of the guarantee of free speech by the Constitution.
Thornhill v. Alabaina, 310 U. S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093
(1940). The California Courts follow a liberal rule which allows
peaceful picketing for a purpose reasonably connected with a con-
troversy affecting workers in an industry generally as well as those
employed by the person against whom the picketing is directed, C. S.
Sinith Metropolitan Market Company v. Lyons, 16 Cal. 2d 389,
106 P. 2d 414 (1940), and in such case the determinative issue is
whether the workmen are demanding something reasonably related
to the employment and to the purpose of collective bargaining. C. S.
Smith Metropolitan Market Company v. Lyons, supra.
The majority opinion of the principal case is in accord with the
modern trend to allow peaceful picketing in aid of a strike for, a
lawful purpose. The dissenting opinion that an injunction should
not be granted, was based on the fact that the picketing was not dis-
orderly nor untruthful and violated no statute or declared public
policy. The dissenting judge evidently took the position that the
strike was not retaliative in nature, as claimed by the plaintiffs, but
was an organization drive, as the defendants contended. But the
7
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majority of the court held that there was evidence to support the
Supreme Court's finding that the strike was retaliative in nature
in a dispute with a rival union. Whether or not any particular strike
is lawful is a question of law, and it seems clearly that a retaliative
strike should fall into that category of strikes which are unlawful.
R. Lim MORGAN, JR.
INSURANCE-Is the Korean Action a War?-On July 25,
1950, one month to the day after the commencement of hostilities
in Korea, defendant-appellee issued a policy of insurance upon the
life of plaintiff's deceased husband. The face amount of the policy
was $2,500 but it contained a clause providing for double indemnity
if the death of the insured resulted solely through accidental means.
The insured was a member of the National Guard having enlisted in
December 1949. His unit was called into federal service in Septem-
ber 1950 and the insured was killed in a railroad accident a few days
later while enroute to a military camp where he was to receive train-
ing. The plaintiff brought an action in assumpsit for the full amount
of $5,000 claiming double indemnity on account of the accidental
death. The policy also contained a clause which stipulated that if
the insured should voluntarily or involuntarily "engage" in military,
air or naval service in "time of war" then the company would not
be liable for the additional accidental death benefit. This clause
constituted the company's defense. The Court of Common Pleas
denied double indemnity, and plaintiff appealed. HELD, reversed.
The insurer failed to meet the burden of proving that the term "war"
included an undeclared as well as a declared war. Judgment was
entered for plaintiff for full amount of policy. Harding v. Pennsyl-
vania Mutual Lifa Insurance Co.. ...... Pa- ------ 90 A. 2d 589 (1952).
Where the terms of a policy are susceptible of two interpretations,
that construction which is most favorable to the insured, in order
to indemnify him for the loss sustained, should be adopted. Koser v.
American Casualty Co. of Reading, 162 Pa. Super. 63, 56 A. 2d 301
(1948). The reason for this rule is that the language of the policy
is prepared by the insurer, presumably with the purpose of protect-
ing itself against future claims in regard to which it does not desire
to accept liability. H oovei v. National Casualty Co., 236 Mo. App.
1093, 162 S. W. 2d 363 (1942). Parties to a contract may define
the meanings of the terms used therein and such meanings as so de-
8
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fined will ordinarily be enforced by the courts. Standard Oil Co.
v. Powell Paving and Contracting Co., 139 S. C. 411, 138 S. E. 184
(1926). The word "engage" within the provision of a life policy
that double indemnity benefits should terminate ii insured should
"engage" in military service in "war time" means "enter into", so
that the insurer's liability for double indemnity terminates upon in-
sured's entry into military service, regardless of whether subsequent
death of insured is the result of military service or not. Wolford v.
Equitable Life Insurance Co. of Iowa, 162 Pa. Super. 259, 57 A.
2d 581 (1948). Death resulting from military service in time of war
comprehends death in actual combat, but it is not so restricted as to
exclude death under other circumstances, if actually resulting from
military service, in time of war. Selenack v. Prudential Insurance
Co. of America, 160 Pa. Super. 242, 50 A. 2d 736 (1947). As is
pointed out in Bas v. Tingy, 4 Dall. 37, 4 U. S. 37, 1 L. Ed. 731
(1799), there is a vast distinction between a declared war and an
undeclared one. Courts do not declare war or make peace. New
York Life Insurance Co. v. Durlzam, 10 Cir., 166 F. 2d 874 (1948).
In deciding judicial questions concerning the commencement or termi-
nation of a state of war, the courts are generally required to refer
to some public act of a political department of the Government.
United States v. Anderson, 76 U. S. 56, 9 Wall. 56, 10 L. Ed. 615
(1870). The condition of peace or war, public or civil, in a legal
sense, must be determined by that political department and the courts
are bound by its decision. United States v. One-Hundred and Twen-
ty-Nine Packages, Fed. Cas. No. 15-941 (1862). The question as
to whether war existed or not at a particular time is not a question
for the jury but is one to be determined alone by the political power
of the Government. Sutton v. Tiller, 46 Tenn. 593, 98 Am. Dec. 471
(1869). War- does not exist merely because of an armed attack by
the military forces of another nation. Savage v. Sun Life Assur-
ance Co. of Canada, D. C. La. 1944, 57 F. Supp. 620. However,
New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dennion, 10 Cir., 158 F. 2d 260
(1946), states that when one sovereign nation attacks another with
premeditated and deliberate intent to wage war against it and that
nation resists with force, war in the grim sense exists and courts
are not required to wait for formalities before recognizing this fact.
This is the minority view and the vast majority in the United States
agrees with West v. Palmetto State Life Insurance Co., 202 S. C.
422, 25 S. E. 2d 475, 145 A. L. R. 1461 (1942) wherein it is deter-
mined that an Act of Congress is necessary to the commencement of a
9
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war, and that the Act is in itself a "declaration" and fixes the date of
that war. Even the President's message to Congress, delivered on the
day following the Pearl Harbor attack, stating that a state of war
"has existed" between the United States and Japan did not amount
to a declaration of war since Congress had not acted at the time.
Rosenau v. Idaho Mutual Benefit Association, 65 Idaho 408, 145 P.
2d 227 (1944); Pang v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 37 Haw. 208
(1945).
The question as to whether or not we are at present engaged in a
"war" is one which will take on increasing* importance as the next
few years pass in review. To the servicemen who are engaged in
that conflict in Korea there is no doubt that it is a war in all its
grimness. However, to the majority of our American Courts death
via bombs and shells is not sufficient evidence to warrant a finding
of war as contemplated by the parties to a life insurance policy con-
taining a "war clause" terminating the double indemnity clause for ac-
cidental death. These courts hold that the war spoken of in such poli-
cies refers only to those wars declared by Congress, thus working a
tremendous hardship on the insurance companies. No doubt when
the policies were written the men drafting these contract thought of
"war" as being an armed conflict between men regardless of who spon-
sored it. Since that time we have gone through Pearl Harbor and
joined the United Nations. Our courts have held that those men
killed at Pearl Harbor could collect double indemnity since Congress
had not declared war as of December 7, 1941. The courts denomin-
ated that action an undeclared war and point out that such wars were
not included under the war clause of the policy. It would follow from
the cases that our courts have now worked themselves into something
of a dilemma considering that Congress has not declared the Korean
action a war. Actually it would seem that our courts would now take
a practical view of the facts and reverse the trend started by the Pearl
Harbor cases. By doing this the courts would place the insurer and
the insured on a level plane and at the same time they would attach
a practical definition to the term "war".
J~ssz J. GuiN, JR.
INSURANCE - AUTOMOBILE - Effect of Policy as to Replace-
ment of Originally Insured Automobile.- Plaititiff brought an ac-
tion for damages against defendant insurance company after the
company refused to pay a claim made under an automobile insur-
10
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ance policy. The policy provided that if the automobile described
in the policy were replaced by another automobile, the second auto-
mobile would be insured under the original policy. Plaintiff had
an accident involving the first automobile after which it was placed
in a garage for repairs. He then purchased another automobile which
he wrecked shortly thereafter. Damages for the second collision
were awarded. On appeal, HELD, affirmed. The second automo-
bile replaced the automobile described in the policy, in the use of
the plaintiff, within the meaning of the policy. Royer v. Shawnee
Mutual Insurance Co., 106 N. E. 784 (Ohio 1950).
The general rule of construction of insurance contracts is that the
contract shall be construed most strongly against the insurer if
such construction is fairly reasonable. Olson v. Standard Marine
Insurance Co . ....... Cal. App. 2d ........ , 240 P. 2d 379 (1952);
Pendell v. Westland Life Insurance Co., 95 Cal. App. 2d 766, 214
P. 2d 392 (1950). And if there is any doubt whether the words
are used in an enlarged or restrictive sense, the construction will
be adopted which is most beneficial to the insured, other things be-
ing equal. Eaves v. Progressive Fire Insurance Co., 217 S. C. 365,
60 S. E. 2d 687 (1950); Berliner v. Travelers Insurance Co., 121
Cal. 458, 53 P. 918 (1898). These rules are illustrated in Home-
stead Fire Insurance Co. v. Dewitt et al ......... Okla- , 245 P.
2d 92, (1952), where it was held that a builders risk policy de-
signed to cover all loss occurring to a building during construction,
also covered loss to an adjoining building which was necessarily in-
volved in the construction within the intention of the parties. It
is further shown in Peony Park v. Security Insurance Co. of New
Haven, Coun., 137 Nebr. 504, 289 N. W. 848 (1940) that where
there are two conflicting clauses within a policy, the one most benefici-
al to the insured must apply. But the rule of strict construction against
an insurer should not be construed "to result in a perversion of
language, or exercise of inventive powers for the purpose of creat-
ing a liability where none exists". S. S. Newell and Co. v. Ameri-
can Mutual Liability Co., 199 S. C. 325, 19 S. E. 2d 463 (1942).
Neither are the courts free to adopt some strained view which was
not contemplated by the parties. Pitts v. Glenn Falls Indemnity Co.,
........ S. C .......... 72 S. E. 2d 174 (1952). And Justice Cardozo
showed reluctance to apply the rule of strict construction against the
insurer in Byrd v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 224
N. Y. 47, 120 N. E. 86 (1918) in which it is stated that the guide
to construction of insurance contracts is the reasonable expectation
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and purpose of the ordinary business man when making an ordinary
business contract, and it is his intention, expressed or reasonably
inferred, which will prevail. There are few cases directly in point
with the instant case, but in an analogous situation, it was held in
Dean v. Niagara Fire Insurance Co. et al., 24 Cal. App. Supp. 2d 762,
68 P. 2d 1021 (1937) that a newly acquired automobile had replaced,
within the meaning of the policy, the originally insured automobile,
even though a state statute declared that legal title would not pass
until registration with the Highway Department had been completed,
and such condition had not been met at the time of the accident.
And the insurer is nevertheless liable for damage incurred by the
second automobile even though a personal liability against the in-
sured continued by statute as to the original automobile until regis-
tration requirements bad been complied with. Schmidt v. C.I.T.
Corporation, 14 Cal. App. 2d 92, 57 P. 2d 1016 (1936). Neither
will technicalities bar the company's liability as is illustrated in Kos-
tecki et al. v. Zaffina, 384 Ill. 192, 51 N. E. 2d 152 (1943) and
Fucaloro v. Standard Surety and Casualty Co. of New York, 225
Iowa 437, 280 N. W. 605 (1938) where it was held that the neces-
sary changes in the policy as to motor and serial numbers being
omitted, did not defeat the liability of the company as to the newly
acquired automobile. This rule is followed in Reimers v. Interna-
tional Indemnity Co., 143 Wash. 193, 254 P. 852 (1927) where a
new chassis and motor were installed on the insured automobile
without the proper changes thereof being recorded in the policy.
More in accord with the problem presented by the instant case is that
of Merchant's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Lambert, 90 N. H. 507, 11 A.
2d 361 (1940) in which the insured had placed his originally insured
automobile in his garage, it being worn out, unfit for use on the
public highways, and not having been driven for several months.
Held, that another car purchased by the insured was a replacement
under the policy. However, where the insured had traded the old
car for a new one, leaving the first car with the motor company to
sell for him, title remaining in the insured, the newly acquired auto-
mobile was not covered by the policy, Mitchum v. Travelers Indem-
nity Co., 127 F. 2d 27 (1942). But this case was distinguished in
Hoffman v. Illinois National Casualty Co., 159 F. 2d 564 (1947)
where the insured was allowed to recover damages to secondly ac-
quired tractor where the original tractor had been partially wrecked
and it had not yet been decided by insured whether to sell or to
repair it.
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It appears from the cases cited that where the originally insured
automobile has been disabled, a replacement by another automobile
in the use of the insured, will be effective under the policy of insur-
ance. But where the automobile is in operating condition, regard-
less of where its physical possession is, a replacement in the use of
the insured by another automobile is not effective. The decisions
against the defendant companies do not discuss the nature of the
disability, that is, whether it is a permanent or temporary one. If
the foregoing may be considered the rule of law, then the instant
case is in accord with the other decisions. However, the decision
in all of the cases depend on the particular set of facts surrounding
the replacement and to declare any established rule may be to work
a hardship on the plaintiff in the instant case. Following the broad
rule of construction set out by Cardozo in the Byrd case, supra, that
ordinary reasonableness as applicable to ordinary business contracts
shall prevail, i. e. the intention of the parties, a practical question
arises in the instant case and also in the Hoffi ui case, supra. Should
the insured at any time again make use of the formerly disabled auto-
mobile, where would the risk then lie? As was pointed out in the
Mitchuin case, supra, neither the insurer nor the insured would be
able to say conclusively which automobile was insured and should
the originally insured automobile be further damaged during its
course of repair, as by fire, etc. or be driven while under repairs and
damaged, the result would be a severe confusion as between the par-
ties and such cannot be held to have been intended by them.
JAmEts AiroD.
TORTS-Injury to Viable, Pre-Natal Child.-An expectant
mother, six months pregnant, ate food unfit for human consumption
in defendant's eating place. As a consequence she was made ill
which resulted in the child being born blind. This suit on the child's
behalf was dismissed. On Appeal, HELD: Affirmed. An action
of tort may not be had for injuries to a viable child in his mother's
womb caused by negligence. Cavanaugh et al. v. First National
Stores, Inc.. ........ Mass ......... 107 N. E. 2d 307 (1952).
There is no precedent at common law giving a child injured when
"en ventre sa mere", but afterwards born alive the right to an action
for injuries received. Buel & United Rys. of St. Louis, 284 Mo.
126, 154 S. W. 71 (1913). An unborn child is a part of its mother
until birth, and, as such, has no judicial existence. Drabbels v.
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Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N. W. 2d 229 (1951); Drobner v.
Peters, 232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567 (1921). An unborn child
is a part of the mother at the time of any injury, any damage to it
which is not too remote if recoverable at all is recoverable by the
mother. Newman v. Detroit, 218 Mich. 60, 274 N. W. 710 (1937) ;
Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R. I. 169, 91 Am. St. Rep. 188 (1901);
Dietrich v. Northampton, 1.38 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
Also if the action could be maintained, an infant may maintain an
action against his own mother for injuries occasioned by the negli-
gence of the mother while pregnant with it. Albaire v. St. Luke's
Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638 (1900). The right of recovery
is denied for it would be impossible to establish except by specula-
tion or conjecture that the condition of the child was proximately
caused by the injury, and this would lead to false claims which
would be difficult to disprove. Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v.
Jordan, 124 Texas 347, 78 S. W. 2d 944 (1935). There are strong
grounds for arguments on both sides of this question and although
some courts say that they hold as the leading case of Dietrich v.
Northampton, s tpra which said that an action could not be brought,
they also say that they would not intimate what their decision would
be if the question were presented for the first time. Bliss v. Passa-
nesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N. E. 2d 206 (1950). (Absence of prece-
dent is no ground for denying recovery where a wrong has been
committed. Bombrest v. Katz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (1946).) The prob-
lem of proof does *not justify denial of a remedy; strict requirements
of competent medical evidence are sufficient safeguards. "It is
hoped that science will keep pace with the law." Williams v. Marion
Rapid Transit Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N. E. 2d 334 (1949). Life
is the immediate gift of God and begins in contemplation of law as
soon as the infant is able to stir in mother's womb, Tucker v. Howard
L. Carmichael & Sons, 208 Ga. 201, 65 S. E. 2d 909 (1951) and a
child conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed an existing person
so far as may be necessary for its interests, personal and property,
in the event of its subsequent birth. Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal.
App. 2d 629, 92 P. 2d 678 (1939). In the case of Tramways v.
Leveille, 4 Dom. L. R. 337 (1933) the court granted relief saying
that to deny the child the right to recover for a pre-natal injury
inflicted upon it would be to allow a wrong for which there was no
remedy. A much later case, Woods v. Lancet, 303 N. Y. 349, 102
N. R. 2d 691, (1951) follows the same reason and the only dissent-
ing judge stated that he also agreed but that the legislature should
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pass laws governing this type of tort as they have done in England
on the same question.
The decision in this case agrees with the majority of such cases
in this country, but the modern trend seems against this view. This
case expresses the understandable reluctance of the majority of courts
to open a new field in tort liability. However, it has long been estab-
lished in torts that for every wrong there is a remedy; and as medical
science proves more conclusively every day that a viable child is an
entity, though in its mother's womb, the trend is toward realizing
that in cases such as this recovery ought to be allowed. There should
be recognized a legal right in a newborn child to begin life with a
sound body.
PERRY WEINBERG.
TORT-Action by Minor Against Parent.-The appellant, minor,
child of respondent, living in the home of and supported by respon-
dent, brought suit for the recovery of damages for personal injuries
sustained in an automobile accident as a result of the alleged negli-
gence of his father. On appeal, HELD, affirmed. An unemanci-
pated minor child, living in his parents' household, cannot maintain
an action in tort against them or either of them, in the absence of
any statute abrogating or changing such common law rule. Redding
v. Redding, ........ N. C ......... 70 S. E. 2d 676 (1952).
Whether a minor was denied the right of action in tort against
his parent at common law appears to be very much a matter of opinion
and conjecture. Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 218 P. 2d 445, 19
A. L. R. 2d 405 (1950), see Anno. It has been declared that there
was never a common law rule that a child could not sue its parents.
Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 A. 905, 71 A. L. R. 1055
(1930) ; Mahnke v. Moore, ...... Md- ------ 77 A. 2d 923 (1951). This
conclusion has been concurred with elsewhere as shown by Chief jus-
tice Clark, dissenting in the case of Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C.
577, 118 S. E. 12, 31 A. L. R. 1135, 22 N. C. C. A. 961 (1923),
and as pronounced in works of English writers. Duzlap v. Dunlap,
supra. A Scottish case went so far as to uphold the right of an
unemancipated minor to maintain a negligence action against his
parent. Young v. Rankin, Scot., Sc. 499 (1934). However, the
opinions of American Courts, with the possible exception of cases
involving damage to property or property rights, Small v. Morrison,
supra; Wells v. Wells, Mo. App., 48 S. W. 2d 109 (1932), often
contain the statement that "at common law" such action was denied
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because of society's interest in preserving harmony in domestic re-
lations. Kelly v. Kelly, 158 S. C. 517, 155 S. E. 888 (1930) ; Mata-
rese v. Matarese, 47 R. I. 131, 131 A. 198, 42 A. L. R. 1360, 25
N. C. C. A. 737 (1925) ; Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788,
68 L. R. A. 893, 107 Am. St. Rep. 805, 3 Ann. Cas. 1 (1905). In
keeping with this tradition, the majority of the jurisdictions, includ-
ing South Carolina, have no statutes authorizing such actions. Kelly
v. Kelly, supra. This denial of an action at common law has been
established in the United States by the weight of authority. Rein-
gold v. Reingold, 115 N. J. L. 532, 181 A. 153 (1935); Crosby v.
Crosby, 230 App. Div. 651, 246 N. Y. S. 384 (1930) ; Wick v. Wick,
192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787, 52 A. L. R. 1113 (1927). In recent
years, however, it has been held that in cases of gross negligence,
approaching or amounting to willful misconduct, the parent may
become liable. Cowgill vo. Boock, supra; Mahnke v. Moore, supra.
With the change in modern business methods, particularly with re-
gard to the growth of insurance coverage available, indications have
appeared of a growing judicial inclination to modify this broad rule.
Cowgill v. Boock, supra; Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra. Consequently,
it is to be noted that grounds for upholding a minor's suit may be
based on the existence of an additional relationship, such as that of
master and servant or carrier and passenger. Worrell v. Worrell,
174 Va. 11, 4 S. E. 2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17,
166 S. E. 538 (1932); Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra.
There has been only one case of this type decided in South Caro-
lina, that of Kelly v. Kelly cited above. The facts leading up to the
bringing of that action were very similar to those that have been set
forth in the recent Redding case. In the Kelly suit, the Court indi-
cated that it would follow the "common law doctrine" already estab-
lished by the weight of authority. In adopting this course, however,
the Court should recognize that an act done by the parent may reach
beyond the protection of the family relation and constitute an inva-
sion of the absolute rights of the child. Under such circumstances
the child should have the same right to recover as any other person
so injured as a result of the negligence of the parent. Recovery
under liability insurance policies should often be allowed regardless
of the parent-child relationship, and a great injustice would be done
if a child were prevented from holding the parent liable in cases of
willful misconduct because of this relation. "The rule of parental
immunity from liability should not apply where the reason for the
rule fails."
JOHN K. DMLOACH, JR.
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